Two studies are reported which demonstrate that analytic responding on everyday reasoning problems can be increased and bias eliminated after training on the law of large numbers. Critical thinking problems involving belief-consistent, neutral, and inconsistent conclusions were presented. Belief bias was eliminated when a written justification of argument strength was elicited. However, belief-based responding was still evident when evaluations of the arguments were elicited using rating scales. This finding demonstrates a dissociation between analytic and belief-based responding as a function of (...) response format. In Experiment 2 an instructional condition designed to foster decontextualised reasoning was included but was ineffective in reducing the degree to which judgements were biased by beliefs. It was concluded that training which makes available the analytic strategies necessary to evaluate a problem has the potential to facilitate performance only if the requested response triggers conscious deliberation of the evidence. (shrink)

Two studies are reported which demonstrate that analytic responding on everyday reasoning problems can be increased and bias eliminated after training on the law of large numbers. Critical thinking problems involving belief-consistent, neutral, and inconsistent conclusions were presented. Belief bias was eliminated when a written justification of argument strength was elicited. However, belief-based responding was still evident when evaluations of the arguments were elicited using rating scales. This finding demonstrates a dissociation between analytic and belief-based responding as a function of (...) response format. In Experiment 2 an instructional condition designed to foster decontextualised reasoning was included but was ineffective in reducing the degree to which judgements were biased by beliefs. It was concluded that training which makes available the analytic strategies necessary to evaluate a problem has the potential to facilitate performance only if the requested response triggers conscious deliberation of the evidence. (shrink)

This symposium discusses J.-L. Dessalles's account of the evolution of language, which was presented in Why we Talk (OUP 2007).

J.L. Ackrill's work on Plato and Aristotle has had a considerable influence upon ancient philosophical studies in the late twentieth century. This volume collects the best of Ackrill's essays on the two greatest philosophers of antiquity. With philosophical acuity and philological expertise he examines a wide range of texts and topics--from ethics and logic to epistemology and metaphysics--that continue to be in the focus of debate.

The lives of children who live at the intersectional nexus between childhood autism and race may be considered as “shadow stories” that have remained silenced in autism literature. We explored the experiences of racialized parents who provide care to autistic children. We drew on a theoretical framework known as DisCrit and decolonizing arts-based methodologies. Racialized parents of autistic children demonstrated resistance along various themes, including fighting the system, protecting my child, and creating cultural communities. We join black girlhood studies, critical (...) race theory, and disabled children’s childhood studies by continuing the journey of decentering Whiteness in childhood disability research. We demonstrate how disabled racialized communities engage in activism and social justice while forming powerful counter-discourses. (shrink)

In 1927, the Scottish philosopher John Anderson arrived in Australia to take up the chair of Philosophy at the University of Sydney. By the late 1930s, the ‘macrostructure’ of his realist system was in place. It includes a theory of process and a substantial metaphysics, one that opposes positivism, linguistic philosophy and all forms of idealism. However, beyond Australia it remains largely unknown, despite its bearing on a number of current issues in psychology and the social sciences generally. This article (...) outlines Anderson’s transition from Hegelian idealism to realism, describes aspects of his ontology and epistemology, compares some of Anderson’s ideas with Dewey’s pragmatism and explains their relevance to present-day psychology. (shrink)

Most mainstream psychologists consider philosophy irrelevant to their work, but see themselves as realists. Various opposition movements embrace philosophy but reject realism, either completely or partially, despite upholding ideas consistent with a realist philosophy. Many on both sides see the Tower of Babel that constitutes psychology as a sign of healthy diversity, not fragmentation. We argue that relations among the three factors – philosophy, realism and fragmentation – deserve closer scrutiny. With philosophy’s core method of conceptual analysis deprioritized, both mainstream (...) psychology and the opposition fracture into an array of “partial realisms”, falling away from a realism that is thoroughly consistent. These are the source of psychology’s fragmentation. The conceptual neglect and resulting confusions can be seen in psychology’s recent replicability crisis, and in the widespread adoption of a representationalist approach to the mind/brain. We argue that the metatheoretical coherence and methodological maturity required for genuine scientific progress involves a consistent adherence to realism. We spell out what that involves and consider several reasons why this has been so difficult for psychology. (shrink)

The system of realist philosophy developed by John Anderson — situational realism — has recently been dismissed as ‘positivist’ by a prominent critical realist. The reason for this dismissal appears not to be the usual list of ideas deemed positivist, but the conviction that situational realism mistakenly defends a form of actualism, i.e. that to conceive of causal laws as constant conjunctions reduces the domain of the real to the domain of the actual. This is, in part, a misreading of (...) Anderson’s philosophy because, contrary to Hume’s constant conjunction account, Anderson viewed causation as pluralistic and non-linear. However, the critical realist charge does point to two important ontological differences between these realist philosophies — a levels-of-reality thesis and the notion of causal powers. Situational realism has always maintained that the arguments for both lead to difficulties that are logically insurmountable. Unfortunately, this is not addressed in the critical realists’ dismissal of Anderson’s philosophy. Regardless of who makes the charge of positivism, it frequently involves inattention to the real character of its target. (shrink)

Slife and Reber ask of psychologists that they recognize their prejudice against theism and the incompatibility between theistic and naturalistic worldviews. Yet, the subtext of their article is that theism and naturalism are equally valid and that psychology’s secularism is a mistake. Given that theism is not beyond reason, the only sufficient ground for charging psychologists with prejudice is if theism has survived serious attempts at conceptual and empirical test, and psychology ignores or disguises this fact. So, the grounds for (...) believing in the reality of a supernatural existent are highly relevant to the authors’ allegation. However, their concept of God affords no such grounds. They disavow the logic involved in the ordinary meaning of the term “incompatible” and they ignore a crucial distinction between conditions of existence and qualities of things or processes. The consequence is that either God is this-worldly, and there is no ontological basis to Slife and Reber’s incompatibility thesis, or God’s mode of existence is quite different from the mode of existence of ordinary things and all the problems of dualism follow. Either way, their charge of prejudice is without foundation. The burden of proof rests with the defender of theism and, for now, psychology’s secularism can be considered a mark of the discipline’s rationality. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Policymakers are responsible for key decisions about political governance. Usually, they are selected or elected based on experience and then supported in their decision-making by the additional counsel of subject experts. Those satisfied with this system believe these individuals – generally speaking – will have the right intuitions about the best types of action. This is important because political decisions have ethical implications; they affect how we all live in society. Nevertheless, there is a wealth of research that cautions against (...) trusting human judgment as it can be severely flawed. This paper will look at the root causes of the most common errors of human judgment before arguing – contra the instincts of many – that future AI systems could take a range of political decisions more reliably. I will argue that, if/when engineers establish ethically robust systems, governments will have a moral obligation to refer to them as a part of decision-making. (shrink)

This symposium discusses J.-L. Dessalles's account of the evolution of language, which was presented in Why we Talk (OUP 2007).

Originally published in Proceedings of the British Academy 60 (1974), 339-359.

J. L. Ackrill; VIII*—Aristotle's Definitions of Psuche, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 73, Issue 1, 1 June 1973, Pages 119–134, https://doi.org.